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Abstract
Orderings and inference relations can be successfully used to model the behavior of a rational
agent. This behavior is indeed represented either by a set of ordered pairs that reflect the agent’s
preferences, or by a rational inference relation that describes the agent’s internal logics. In the finite
case where we work, both structures admit a simple representation by means of logical chains. The
problem of revising such inference processes arises when it appears necessary to modify the original
model in order to take into account new facts about the agent’s behavior. How is it then possible to
perform the desired modification? We study here the possibilities offered by the technique of ‘chain
revision’ which appears to be the easiest way to treat this kind of problem: the revision is performed
through a simple modification of the logical chain attached to the agent’s behavior, and the revision
problem boils down to adding, retracting or modifying some of the links of the original chain. This
perspective permits an effective treatment of the problems of both simple and multiple revision. The
technique developed can also be used in some limiting cases, when the agent’s inference process is
only partially known, encoded by an incomplete set of preferences or a conditional knowledge base.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We showed recently (see [3–5]) that it was possible to study the behavior of an agent,
expressed by a set of preferences or by an inference relation, through a certain auxiliary
subset of the underlying propositional language L. When the behavior to be studied is of
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rational type, it can be very simply represented by means of a logical chain. This means
that if  is the strict partial order over L that represents the preferences of the agent and
if |∼ is the rational inference relation that models the agent’s reasoning, there exists a
sequence of formulas δ0, δ1, . . . , δn, each δi implying δi+1, such that the preference α  β
holds if and only if there exists a link δi that is both consistent with α and inconsistent with
β . Similarly the conditional α |∼β holds if and only if there exits a δi that is both consistent
with α and inconsistent with α∧¬β . The behavior of the agent is thus entirely determined
by this subjacent logical chain.
This representation of inferences or preferences by means of logical chains reveals
itself to be a particularly useful tool when one has to operate changes in the agent’s
behavior. It may indeed be the case that a given preference α  β that does not model
accurately enough the behavior of the agent has to be retracted from the set of preferences
of this agent, or even that it has to be replaced by β  α. When performing the desired
modification, one has to be aware of all the implications this change may induce on the
other preferences. To take a trivial example, the preference α  β that has to be retracted
may come as a result from α  γ and γ  β , so it will be necessary to either reverse one,
at least, of these inequalities, or decide to retract both of them, a choice that may of course
interfere with other preferences of the initial set. Translating in terms of preferences the
results that were established, in [5], in the framework of rational inference relations, we
shall see that the right tool to handle this kind of problem is again provided by logical
chains: the whole revision process boils down to a suitable action on the subjacent chain,
and this framework leads to a solution that is by far the easiest to perform, as well as
the most accurate when one wishes to respect some elementary principles of success and
minimal change.
This ‘standard’ revision process finds its limits in two important domains. The first
one occurs in the case of simultaneous revision, where a given rational inference relation
has to be revised by an arbitrary set of conditionals. Iterated chain-revisions then are not
sufficient. We shall see that in this case it is useful to treat the set of conditionals we want to
revise with as a conditional base: taking its rational closure and working on the associated
chain enables us eventually to find a fairly reasonable solution to the multiple revision
problem.
The second limit to chain revision technique occurs when one only knows part of the
agent’s preferences or when the agent’s behavior is modelled by a conditional base that
only provides partial information on the agent’s reasoning. Although it is always possible
to perform the desired revision on some completion of this base, for instance on its rational
closure, we have to take into account the relative significance of the conditional that is
to be modified: if this conditional is itself part of the base, it has to be considered as
more important than if it is only entailed by this base, in which case it only plays a
secondary role. Chain representation is therefore not sufficient by itself to treat the problem
of revising incomplete information. Nevertheless we shall see that in some particular cases
(the revision of minimal bases by free conditionals) this technique applies successfully and
leads to interesting solutions.
This paper therefore deals with several aspects of conditional revision. First, in the case
where the agent’s behavior is fully described by a complete set of preferences or a well-
defined rational inference relation, we will recall and translate in our framework some
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previous results established in [4] and [5], showing how to revise this structure by a single
preference or a single conditional. Next, supposing we only know part of the structure that
encodes the agent’s behavior, we will address the problem of performing a revision on an
incomplete set of preferences or on a conditional base. Finally we will turn to the problem
of multiple revision, that occurs when one has to revise a complete or incomplete structure
by a set of several preferences or conditionals.
In order to make this paper self-contained, we will recall the basic facts concerning
rational orders and rational inference relations. These two notions fundamentally cover the
same ratione but they convey different perspectives, and this is the reason why we think
it interesting to translate and interpret our results in both frameworks. We shall recall the
construction proposed in [4] of the logical chain attached to a rational preference order,
and we shall put in evidence the duality between preference orders and logical chains. This
will enable us to handle correctly the problem of revising these orders: working through
the associated chain, we will find a simple solution that happens to be an optimal one, in a
sense that will be made precise. We shall compare our solution with another one that was
proposed in [2]. Then we will briefly evoke the problem of sequentially revising a rational
inference relation by several conditionals, before turning to that of simultaneous revision.
This will drive us to the basic definitions relative to rational closure and to the construction
of the associated logical chain. We shall introduce the new concept of a minimal conditional
base, and that of a ‘free’ conditional. As we shall see, this will provide a solution both to
the problems of conditional revision and to that of simultaneous revision.
The propositional calculus is particularly adequate when one has to deal with the notions
of qualitative utility, preferences or beliefs. Although it is possible to work on the semantic
level, translating preferences and inferences by order relations over worlds and logical
chains by Lewis/Grove spheres, we will stay on the syntactic level: we indeed think this
framework more suitable to interpret results concerning preferences and beliefs. Since we
work in a finite language, these two levels are equivalent, and translation from one to the
other is immediate.
Throughout this paper, we shall denote by L a propositional language built through the
usual Boolean connectives on a finite number n of propositional variables p1,p2, . . . , pn.
Such an atom pi may be viewed as a belief, an alternative, or as the propensity of
purchasing some given elementary item Pi , the negation ¬pi reflecting in this case the
reluctance of purchasing Pi . A literal is a formula of the form pi or ¬pi . A conjunction of
literals in all the n variables is called a complete formula. Any formula of Lmay be written
as a disjunction of complete formulas, its disjunctive normal form. We denote respectively
by  and ⊥ the tautology true and the contradiction false. The classical consequence
operator of L will be denoted by the symbol 	. Thus we read α 	 β as “β logically follows
from α”, or “α implies β”. We say that two formulas α and β are (classically) equivalent
(written α ≡ β) if α implies β and β implies α. A formula α is said to be consistent
if it does not imply ⊥, inconsistent if it implies ⊥. A formula α is consistent with the
formula β if it does not imply ¬β . Since the language is supposed to be built on exactly n
elementary propositions, we have either γ 	 α or γ 	¬α for any complete formula γ and
any formula α.
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2. Rational inferences and preferences2.1. Definitions and elementary properties
2.1.1. The notion of rational preference
The central notion of this paper is that of preference. As this term is fairly vague and
ambiguous, we must emphasize that in the present work we consider only those preferences
that suppose the possible giving up of an item in favor of the preferred one: when we say
that an agent prefers A to B, we mean that in the case the agent has to choose between A
and B, not only would he take A but he would also reject B. Thus the relation of preference
only holds between two items between which one does not really hesitate, as in the “Your
money or your life” context. In this situation, it is indeed the case that giving one’s money
is preferred, in the above sense, to giving one’s life (and similarly, keeping one’s life is
preferred to keeping one’s money). On the other hand, we cannot say that one prefers tea
with milk to tea, since it is meaningless to give up drinking tea in order to drink tea, be it
with milk. Rather, we will say that one prefers tea with milk to tea without milk. To make
this notion of preference more precise, we will suppose that it is expressed through a strict
partial order  defined on the language L (more precisely on the Lindenbaum algebra
associated with this language). Thus a relation of the type α  β is to be interpreted as “in
the agent’s mind, α is preferable to β”: for this agent, the utility of the item proposed by
α is greater than that of the item represented by β . It may be also helpful to keep in mind
some other interpretations of the relation : thus in a different context, we may as well
translate α  β by “in the agent’s mind the event α is more likely to happen than the event
β”, or, as it was first studied in [6] (but see also [8]) “in the agent’s mind, the belief that α
is true is more entrenched than the belief that β is true”.
The above considerations show that the preference relations we consider will satisfy
some well-defined properties. Clearly, these relations are expected to be irreflexive, as one
cannot give up an item A in order to get it. What is more important, they have to behave
properly with respect to the consequence operation 	: indeed, if α is preferred to β , that
is, if one is ready to give up β in order to get α, then any consequence of α must also be
preferred to β . This because the choice of α implies at the same time the choice of all its
consequences. In the “Your money or your life” example, this becomes particularly clear:
any consequence of giving one’s money is preferred to the loss of life. Again, although we
do not deny their existence, we are not dealing here with preferences usually referred to in
every-day life, when we have to choose say between two different models of cars: there,
it may happen that model α is preferred overall to model β in spite of the fact that β has
some qualities that α lacks. The relation between the consequence relation and the order
 may better be understood if we think of it as a way to compare beliefs or possibilities:
if event A occurs more often than event B , then the same is true for any of its classical
consequences. Similarly, if one’s belief in α is more entrenched than his belief in β , then
so is his belief in any consequence of α.
With this in mind, we can now proceed to the definition of a rational preference relation.
For simplicity, we shall make use of the notationwhich will be defined as usual by β  α
iff one does not have α  β . We will say that a binary relation  over L is a relation of
rational preference if it satisfies the five following properties:
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Pr0 α  β for any inconsistent formula β .
Pr1 If α  β then α  β for all consistent formulas α and β .
Pr2 If α  γ and α 	 β then β  γ .
Pr3 If α ∨ β  β then α  β .
Pr4 If γ  α and α  β then γ  β .
The first rule states that anything is preferred to an inconsistent formula, even
that formula itself. The second one expresses asymmetry, (and hence irreflexivity) for
consistent formulas: if α is preferred to β , then β cannot be preferred to α. This translates
the fact that only strong preferences will be considered. Note that Pr1 is equivalent to the
property of connectedness of the relation : given two formulas α and β , one has either
α  β or β  α.
The rule Pr2 was already examined. It expresses the fact that one cannot prefer a formula
α to a formula γ unless every single consequence of α is also preferred to γ . In a set-
theoretic representation of objects of choice, its translation would be: if A⊆ B and A C,
then B  C.
The rule Pr3 may be illustrated by the fact that if, rather than a box containing an item
B, an agent prefers to choose a box that may indifferently contain A or B, then it must be
the case that this agent prefers A to B. In the context where  compares the plausibility of
two events, this rule means that if α ∨ β is more likely to happen than β , then α itself is
more likely to happen than β . If  compares the entrenchment of beliefs, this rule simply
says that believing more in the truth of α ∨ β than in that of β implies that one believes
more in the truth of α than in that of β . The translation of Pr3 in set theory would be: if
A∪B  B , then A B .
Finally, the modularity rule Pr4 expresses the natural fact that if γ is preferred to α
while β is not preferred to α, then it must be the case that γ is preferred to β : if someone
has a marked preference for bananas over oranges, but does not appreciate apples more
than oranges, then he should prefer a banana to an apple. This rule is equivalent to the
transitivity of the relation .
One readily sees that any relation satisfying the rules Pr1 and Pr4 is irreflexive and
transitive over consistent formulae. A rational preference relation therefore induces a strict
partial order on the set of all consistent formulas of L.
Let us illustrate this notion of rational orders by a simple example: let δ be any consistent
formula of L, and consider the relation  defined by: α  β iff δ is consistent with α and
inconsistent with β . Then it is easily checked that this relation satisfies properties Pr0 to
Pr4 and is thus a rational preference order. It corresponds to the natural order induced on
the power set of a set E by a subset of ‘best’ elements D, this order being defined by:
A B iff A∩D = ∅ and B ∩D = ∅: the subset A is preferred to the subset B iff some of
the best elements of E are members of A whilst none of them is a member of B .
Let us quickly mention five derived rules satisfied by the restriction to consistent
formulas of a rational preference :
1. α  β ∨ γ iff α  β and α  γ .
2. β ∨ γ  α iff β  α or γ  α.
3. α  α ∧¬β iff α ∧ β  α ∧¬β .
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4.  α iff ¬α  α.
5. β  α whenever α 	 β .
The first rule expresses the fact that a formula α is preferred to a combination β ∨ γ if
and only if α is preferred both to β and to γ . For the proof, note that if one has α  β ∨ γ
and, for instance, β  α, then it follows from Pr4 that β  β ∨ γ ; this together with the
fact that β 	 β ∨ γ contradicts Pr2. For the converse, suppose we have α  β and α  γ
and β ∨ γ  α.Then by Pr4 we get β ∨ γ  β and β ∨ γ  γ , that is, using Pr3, γ  β
and β  γ , contradicting Pr1.
Rule 2, which means that a disjunction β ∨ γ is preferred to a formula α iff one at least
of the formulas β or γ is itself preferred to α, is a direct consequence of Pr4.
Rule 3 is immediate writing α = (α ∧¬β)∨ (α ∧ β).
Similarly, the fourth rule is a direct consequence of = α ∨¬α, and the last one is an
immediate application of Pr2.
2.1.2. Rational preference orders and rational inference relations
Given a rational preference order , we may consider the inference relation |∼ on L
defined by α |∼ β iff α ∧ β  α ∧ ¬β . This inference relation can be interpreted by: α
entails β iff α with β is preferred to α without β . We have then α |∼ β iff α  α ∧ ¬β ,
showing that given α, we are ready to jump to the conclusion β iff we know that α alone
happens more frequently than α together with ¬β . It is well-known (see for instance [6])
that the relation |∼ thus defined is a rational consistent inference relation. This means it
satisfies the properties:
Reflexivity α |∼ α.
Left Logical Equivalence If α ≡ β and α |∼ γ then β |∼ γ .
Right Weakening If α 	 β and γ |∼ α, then γ |∼ β.
Cut If α |∼ β and α ∧ β |∼ γ then α |∼ γ .
Or If α |∼ γ and β |∼ γ , then α ∨ β |∼ γ .
Consistency If α |∼⊥ then α 	⊥.
Rational Monotony If α |∼ β and not α |∼¬γ , then α ∧ γ |∼ β.
Conversely, given a rational consistent inference relation |∼, one easily shows that the
relation |∼ defined by α |∼ β iff α ∨ β |∼¬β is a rational preference order. This order
may be interpreted as: α is preferred to β iff, given the alternative α or β , β is rejected.
It is not difficult to show that |∼ =, and that |∼|∼ = |∼. Thus, in the finite case,
rational orders and rational inference relations are exactly the same, and the translation of
the results established in one domain easily translate into the other one via the formulas
given above.
We shall indifferently use the notation |∼ or C in this context of rational inference
relations: thus, we may write β ∈ C(α) for α |∼β . By a convenient abuse of notation, we
may also write α |∼β ∈ C for (α,β) ∈ |∼.
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2.1.3. The ranking function associated with a rational preference
Given a rational preference  on the language L, it is straightforward to check that the
relation ∼ defined by: α ∼ β iff α  β and β  α is an equivalence relation. The set of
equivalence classes [α] (α a consistent formula) is totally ordered through the relation 
defined by [α]  [β] iff α  β . The map that associates with every consistent formula
its equivalence class provides a function κ from the set of consistent formulas onto a
finite totally ordered set, and this set can be normalized to be the interval [0, h − 1] def=
{0,1,2, . . . , h− 1}. The function κ will be referred to as the utility function or the ranking
function associated with the preference , and the integer κ (α) as the rank of α. As for
the integer h, we will indifferently refer to it as the height of κ , or the height of . We
have κ(α)  κ(β) iff α  β . Thus the formula α will be preferred to the formula β iff the
utility of the item represented by α is greater than that of the item represented by β . If the
associated rational inference relation |∼ is represented by its standard model, (W,<) we
have m < n iff c(m)  c(n) where c(m) and c(n) are the complete formulas associated
with m and n. Note that one has κ(α)= κ(β) whenever α ≡ β .
Lemma 1. For all consistent formulas α and β one has
κ(α ∨ β)=max(κ(α),κ(β)).
Proof. Suppose for instance that max(κ(α),κ(β)) = κ(α). We have then α  β , hence,
by Pr3, α  α ∨ β . Also, since α implies α ∨ β , we have, by Pr1 and Pr2, α ∨ β  α. This
shows that [α] = [α ∨ β], so that these formulas have same rank. ✷
The utility of a disjunction is thus the greatest of the utility of its components. This
important property in fact characterizes the class of utility functions that stem from
rational preference orders: indeed, suppose given a function κ from the subset of consistent
formulas of L onto [0, h− 1] that satisfies κ(α ∨ β)=max(κ(α), κ(β)) and κ(α)= κ(β)
whenever α and β are equivalent. Define the relation  on L by: α  β iff β = ⊥ or
κ(α) > κ(β). Then one easily checks that  is a rational preference relation and that its
associated ranking function is equal to κ .
This result together with the above lemma shows that there is a one to one mapping
between the family of rational preferences and that of the integral functions κ that are
defined on the Lindenbaum algebra of a propositional language and that satisfy the
equality
κ(α ∨ β)=max(κ(α),κ(β)).
Remark 1. Lemma 1 above shows that the ranking function associated with a rational
preference is totally determined by its values on complete formulas: writing indeed
α as the disjunction of all complete formulas γ such that γ 	 α, we have κ(α) =
max(κ(γ )/γ 	 α,γ complete). Similarly one sees from the first and second derived
rules that the relation  over formulas is fully determined by its restriction to complete
formulas. We will refer to this restriction as to the complete set of preferences given by
the preference relation . Thus we consider we are given the complete set of preferences
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of an agent if and only we know the rank of every complete formula of the underlying
language.
2.2. Rational preferences and logical chains
A logical chain ∆ is a sequence of non-equivalent formulas
δ0 	 δ1 	 δ2 	 · · · 	 δh−1.
In the sequel, we will always suppose that the last term of the chain is equal to . A chain
∆ of the above form, with δh−1 =  will be said of length or of height h. Such a chain
gives rise to a function κ∆ from L to [0, h− 1] defined by κ∆(α)= h− 1− r(α), where
r(α) is the first index i such that δi is consistent with α. Thus the formulas of highest
rank h − 1 are the formulas that are consistent with δ0, while the formulas of rank 0
are those that are inconsistent with all the links of the chain but the last one. One has
readily κ∆(α ∨ β)= max(κ∆(α),κ∆(β)), so, as noticed above, κ∆ is a ranking function.
Its associated rational preference order ∆ is defined by α ∆ β iff κ∆(α) > κ∆(β), that
is iff r(α) < r(β). Equivalently, we have α ∆ β iff there exists a link that is consistent
with α but not with β . We will say in this case that the chain ∆ induces or entails the
preference α  β .
Similarly, the chain ∆ induces a consistent rational inference relation |∼∆ defined by
α |∼∆ β iff there exists a link that is consistent with α and inconsistent with α ∧ ¬β , that
is iff r(α) < r(α ∧¬β).
The main interest in introducing logical chains is that any rational preference is induced
by such a chain. More precisely we have the following syntactic analogue of a result first
established by Grove [7] in the framework of belief revision.
Theorem 1. Let  be a rational preference on L. Then, up to classical equivalence, there
exists a unique chain ∆ such that  = ∆. Similarly, given a rational inference relation
|∼, there exists a unique chain ∆ such that |∼ = |∼∆.
Proof. Let κ be the normalized ranking function associated with the preference  order,
and h its height. For each integer i ∈ [0, h − 1] denote by δi the disjunction of all the
complete formulas of rank  h− 1− i . This yields a chain ∆= δ0 	 δ1 	 δ2 	 · · · 	 δh−1
of length h, with last term equal to . We have to prove that, for any consistent formula
α, κ∆(α) = κ(α). Note first that for any index i  κ(α), δi is the disjunction of all the
complete formulas that have rank κ(α). Writing α as a disjunction of complete formulas,
one sees that one at least of these formulas, say γ , must have rank equal to κ(α). We have
therefore γ 	 δi . As we have readily γ 	 α, it follows that γ 	 α ∧ δi , showing that α is
consistent with δi for any index i  κ(α).
Conversely, suppose that i < h − 1 − κ(α). The formula δi is then a disjunction
of complete formulas of rank strictly greater than κ(α). If γ is such a formula, one
has necessarily γ 	 ¬α: otherwise we would have γ 	 α, which by rule Pr1 and Pr2
contradicts γ  α. This shows that α is inconsistent with δi for all i < h − 1 − κ(α).
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It follows that the first index i such that α is consistent with δi is i = h − 1 − κ(α).
We have therefore r(α) = h − 1 − κ(α), which yields κ∆(α) = h − 1 − r(α) = κ(α) as
desired.
It remains to prove that if two different chains ∆ and ∆′ induce the same ranking,
they are equal. Note, first, that these chains must have the same length h, as his length
is equal to the height of the induced ranking. Next, by the definition of this ranking,
we must have r(α) = r ′(α) for any formula α. Consider then the j th links δj and δ′j .
We cannot have r(¬δ′j ) = j , as this would imply r ′(¬δ′j ) = j , hence δ′j consistent with
¬δ′j . Therefore, we have δj 	 δ′j . Similarly, one shows that δ′j 	 δj , so that δj and δ′j are
equivalent formulas. ✷
The above theorem shows that in a finite environment the preferences, or the behavior,
of a rational agent are always determined by a subjacent logical chain. An more general
property was established in [3], showing an analogous result for preference orders that
do not necessarily satisfy the property of modularity expressed by Pr4. Nevertheless, the
condition that the given propositional language is finite is essential: as we showed there,
there exists an example of a simple rational preferences of height 2 that cannot come from
any logical chain.
Example 1. In the propositional language built on the two elementary propositions p and
q representing the propensity to respectively purchase the items P and Q, suppose that the
preferences of an agent are given by the following ranked order:
p ∧ q 2
¬p ∧ q ,¬p ∧¬q 1
p ∧¬q 0
Then the associated chain is p ∧ q 	 q ∨¬p 	. It can be interpreted in the following
manner: the agent’s first aim is to purchase both items P and Q. If this is not possible, he
will try to acquire Q or keep off purchasing P . Note that we have p  ¬q : in the agent’s
mind, p is much preferable to ¬q ; having to chose between p and ¬q , he will reject ¬q ,
thus deciding both for p and q (cf. the “Your money or your life” example).
We summarize in Table 1 the definitions of |∼,  and ∆ in terms of each other.
Table 1
From  to |∼ α |∼β iff α  (α ∧¬β)
From |∼ to  α  β iff α ∨ β |∼¬β
From ∆ to |∼ α |∼β iff ∃δi consistent with α and inconsistent with α ∧¬β
From ∆ to  α  β iff ∃δi consistent with α and inconsistent with β
From κ to ∆ δi =
∨
γ ; γ a complete formula with κ(γ ) h− 1− i
From ∆ to κ κ(α)= h− 1− r(α)
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2.3. Revising a complete set of rational preferences2.3.1. How to handle the problem of preferences revision
Classically, a revision problem occurs when, disposing of a set of formulas (a knowledge
base) that is supposed to represent all the information at one’s disposal, it appears necessary
to modify this set in order to take into account a new piece of information. A revision
operation then consists in retracting from or adding to this basis one or several formulas.
The famous AGM postulates [1] have been the guiding line for a number of researchers
in an attempt to find optimal solutions. We have to point out, though, that this problem of
classical revision does not fall within the scope of the present work: even if the reader finds
some formal analogy with the classical formalism—e.g., similar terms and definitions—he
should be aware that we are working now in a completely different perspective.
To our knowledge and contrarily to classical revision and up-dating, very few
researchers have written on the problem of preference revising. Quite simply put, this
problem may be defined as the following one: we suppose the behavior of a given agent is
represented by the set of his rational preferences and we decide to modify this behavior;
in this purpose, we have to withdraw, add, or replace one—or several—given preferences.
In most cases, this can be done in several different ways and the problem is: on which
grounds should we decide, and which method, if any, should we adopt? For instance, in the
preceding example
p ∧ q 2
¬p ∧ q ,¬p ∧¬q 1
p ∧¬q 0
we saw we had p  ¬q . If we come to learn that, after all, this relation is not part of the
agent’s preferences, or even that we have to replace it by the inverse one, ¬q  p, how
should we change our model? Note that the following rankings, all inducing ¬q  p, all
‘naturally’ derived from the initial one, seem equally possible:
¬p ∧¬q 3
p ∧ q 2 ¬p ∧¬q ¬p ∧ q 2 ¬p ∧¬q 2
¬p ∧ q 1 p ∧¬q 1 p ∧ q ¬p ∧ q 1
p ∧¬q 0 p ∧ q 0 p ∧¬q 0
Any of these three rankings induces the desired preference ¬q  p, but they all do it at
some expense, inducing changes that do not seem to be necessary: for instance, in the first
and the third one, we have ¬p ∧ ¬q  ¬p ∧ q , while these formulas had initially same
rank, and, in the second one, we get p ∧ ¬q  p ∧ q , reversing the original preference.
Thus, it is clear that none of the above modifications may be considered as an optimal one,
as they all imply some unnecessary loss of the original information. We see that even in
the simplest situation of a language with only two propositional variables the preference
revision problem does not offer quite an obvious solution.
Things work differently if one addresses this problem in the perspective of logical
chains: indeed, by what we saw in the preceding section, any rational preference may be
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represented by a well-determined chain. So the operation of transforming this preference
order into another one boils down to a chain-transformation problem: given a logical chain
∆ that induces the preference α  β , transform it in a reasonable fashion into a chain
∆′ that will no longer induce α  β , (or that will induce α′  β ′). Of course, we have
to be a bit more precise concerning this ‘reasonable’ fashion and examine more closely
what properties we should expect from an ideal transformation. For this it will be useful
to make a distinction between two different problems, that of the contraction of a rational
preference set by a preference α  β and that of its revision by this preference:
(a) The contraction problem occurs when one wants to withdraw a particular preference
α  β from the given set of rational preferences, or when a particular conditionalα |∼β
should be retracted from the rational inference relation |∼ that models the agent’s
behavior. This problem amounts to the following one: given a logical chain ∆ that
entails α  β , build a new chain ∆ ÷ (α  β) that no longer entails this particular
preference or this particular conditional.
(b) We shall talk of the revision of a set of rational preferences by a preference α  β
when we deal with the problem of adding this particular preference to the given set.
In other words, starting from a chain ∆ that does not entail α  β , we are looking
for a chain ∆  (α  β) that entails this preference. Equivalently, we shall talk of the
revision of a rational inference relation |∼ by a conditional α |∼β .
Note that contracting or revising by a conditional α |∼β is nothing else than contracting
or revising by the preference α  α∧¬β , so that preference revision immediately translate
into conditional revision.
Considering both operations of contraction and revision, there exists a few natural and
elementary principles that we should observe. Naturally, we first expect success, in the
sense that the contraction by α  β should no longer entail this preference, while revision
by α  β should do so. But apart from this quite legitimate constraint, there is another
principle we would like to conform to, that of minimal change, which requires to change as
little as possible from the behavior of the agent, in as much as this behavior is represented
by his set of preferences. More precisely we shall work with the following constraints:
(1) α  β is not entailed by ∆÷ (α  β).
(2) α  β is entailed by ∆  (α  β).
(3) If ∆ does not entail α  β , then ∆÷ (α  β)=∆.
(4) If ∆ entails α  β , then ∆  (α  β)=∆.
(5) Contracting by α  β does not add any new preferences.
(6) Contracting by α  β eliminates only the preferences that necessarily imply α  β .
(7) Revising by α  β eliminates only the preferences that are incompatible with α  β .
(8) Revising by α  β doesn’t add new preferences unnecessarily.
The four first constraints translate the principles of success and minimal change and are
self-explanatory. The fifth one states that if one desires to withdraw a particular preference
from the set of preferences of an agent, this should be done without adding any new
preference. Indeed, the introduction of a new preference is supported by no justification
116 M. Freund / Artificial Intelligence 152 (2004) 105–137
and would be thus quite arbitrary. The sixth rule recalls that the aim of the contraction
is to withdraw α  β and nothing else when possible. If this is not possible, then only
a minimal number preferences have to be withdrawn. Similarly the two last constraints
define a principle of minimal change for revision: it may well be the case that a new
preference cannot be added alone to the agent’s preference set, and that it implies moreover
to withdraw some of the initial preferences. But in both cases, the operation of revision
should be performed in such a way that no unnecessary changes will be effected.
These principles being stated, it will be easy to apply them in cases of both contraction
and revision, making simply use of the following
Lemma 2. Let ∆ and ∆′ be two logical chains, with induced preference orders ∆ and
∆′ . Then one has ∆ ⊆ ∆′ iff ∆ is a sub-chain of ∆′.
Proof. Suppose first that ∆ is a sub-chain of ∆′. If we have α ∆ β for two formulas α
and β , this implies by definition that there exists a link of ∆ that is consistent with α and
inconsistent with β . Since this link is also a member of the chain ∆′, we have immediately
α ∆′ β .
Conversely, let us show that ∆ ⊆ ∆′ implies that ∆ is a sub-chain of ∆′.
Recall that, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1, the ith link δi of the chain ∆ is
the disjunction of all complete formulas γ such that κ∆(γ )  h − 1 − i , where h is the
length of ∆. Let ζ be a complete formula with minimal κ∆′ rank among the complete
formulas that have κ∆ rank equal to h− 1− i . The link δi is then the disjunction of all the
complete formulas γ such that κ∆(γ ) κ∆(ζ ). Set j = h′ − 1− κ∆′(ζ ). We claim that δi
is precisely equal to δ′j , and is thus the j th link of ∆′. By the choice of ζ , and the fact that
∆ ⊆∆′ , we have indeed h′ −1−j = κ∆′(ζ ) κ∆′(γ ) for any complete formula γ with
κ∆ rank h−1− i . Conversely, if γ is a complete formula such that κ∆′(γ ) h′ −1− j ,
we have κ∆′(ζ )  κ∆′(γ ), and it follows that ζ ∆′ γ and therefore, by our hypothesis,
that ζ ∆ γ . This means that h− 1− i  κ∆(γ ). We have therefore proven that, given a
complete formula γ , one has κ∆(γ ) h− 1− i iff κ∆′(γ ) h′ − 1− κ∆′(ζ ). This shows
that δi = δ′j , and the proof of the lemma is complete. ✷
2.3.2. Chain contraction
We suppose now that the preferences of an agent are given by a logical chain
∆= δ0 	 δ1 	 δ2 	 · · · 	 δh−1
with last link equal to . We want to build a new chain ∆′ = ∆ ÷ (α  β) that does
not induce α ∆′ β . Taking into account the principles exposed in the precedent section,
Lemma 2 suggests that the chain ∆′ we are looking for should be a maximal sub-chain of
∆ that does not entail α  β .
Denote by i = r(α) the first index such that δi is consistent with α, and by j = r(β) the
first index such that δj is consistent with β . Recall that a chain Γ entails the preference
α  β iff r(α) < r(β).
If j  i , ∆ does not entail the preference α  β , and we just set ∆′ =∆.
If i < j , any sub-chain of ∆ that contains a link δs with i  s < j will still induce α  β .
We have therefore to remove from the chain ∆ all its links δs such that r(α) s < r(β). It
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follows that the (unique) solution to the contraction problem is the chain:
∆÷ (α  β)= δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 δj 	 δj+1 	 · · · 	 δh−1.
Let us compute the new rank κ ′ = κ∆÷(αβ) induced by ∆′ =∆÷ (α  β). We have,
for any formula γ , κ(γ ) = h − 1 − r(γ ) and κ ′(γ ) = h′ − 1 − r ′(γ ). Note first that we
have h′ = h− (j − i), that is h′ = h− ((κ(α)− κ(β)). We get therefore
r ′(γ )= r(γ ) if r(γ ) r(α), that is if κ(α) κ(γ ),
r ′(γ )= r(α) if r(α) < r(γ ) r(β), that is if κ(β) κ(γ ) < κ(α) and
r ′(γ )= r(γ )− (κ(α)− κ(β)) if κ(γ ) < κ(β).
It follows that the new ranking κ ′ is given by
κ ′(γ )=
{
κ(γ )− [κ(α)− κ(β)] if κ(α) κ(γ ),
κ(β) if κ(β) κ(γ ) < κ(α),
κ(γ ) if κ(γ ) < κ(β).
Clearly the contraction operation thus defined fully meets the constraints of success and of
minimal change that were required for any ‘reasonable’ contraction operation.
Translating this in the framework of consistent rational inference relations, we see that,
if such an inference relation C is given by the chain ∆, the contraction of C by α |∼β is the
rational inference relation induced by the chain δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 δk 	 δk+1 	 · · · 	
δh−1 with i = r(α) and k = r(α ∧¬β).
Example 2. We consider Example 1 where the preferences of the agent are given by the
ranking
p ∧ q 2
¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q 1
p ∧¬q 0
As we saw, the associated chain is ∆ = p ∧ q 	 q ∨ ¬p 	 . This ranking induces
the preference p  ¬q . With the above notation, we have readily i = 0 and j = 1. The
contraction by p  ¬q leads to the chain ∆ ÷ (p  ¬q) = ¬p ∨ q 	  and the revised
ranking is now
p ∧ q ¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q 1
p ∧¬q 0
Comparison with Boutilier–Goldszmidt work. In [2], the authors proposed a “natural
contraction operator” to solve the problem of conditional contraction by α |∼β . Their
method amounts to raising all the complete formulas that imply α∧¬β to a new rank equal
to that of α, leaving the other complete formulas unchanged. This, of course, operates the
desired modification, but minimality is far from being reached, as it would be enough, for
instance to raise only one of these complete formulas to κ(α). If we apply this method in
the preceding example, we see that, after contraction of the ranking
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p ∧ q 2
¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q 1
p ∧¬q 0
by the conditional p ∨¬q |∼q , we get by natural contraction the new ranking
p ∧ q p ∧¬q ¬p ∧¬q 1
¬p ∧ q 0
Note for instance that in the process, the conditional p |∼q is lost as well as the
conditional¬q |∼¬p, both conditionals induced by the original relation and both preserved
in our process of chain contraction. The fact that unnecessary changes are effected by
this “natural contraction” does not seem either to be compensated by any real intuitive
advantage.
We now consider the well-known penguin example:
Example 3. The propositional language is built on the three variables p (penguins),
f (flying animal) and b (bird). Let |∼ be the rational inference relation given by the ranking
¬p ∧ b ∧ f ¬p ∧¬b ∧ f ¬p ∧¬b ∧¬f
p ∧ b ∧¬f ¬p ∧ b ∧¬f
p ∧ b ∧ f p ∧¬b ∧ f p ∧¬b ∧¬f
The associated chain is then ¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ) 	 (¬p ∨ b)∧ (¬p ∨¬f ) 	. Suppose
we want to eliminate from this relation the conditional ¬f |∼¬p, that says that something
that does not fly is generally not a penguin. Using chain contraction, we get the chain
¬p ∨ b)∧ (¬p ∨¬f ) 	 and thus the ranking
¬p ∧¬b ∧ f ¬p ∧ b ∧ f ¬p ∧¬b ∧¬f p ∧ b ∧¬f ¬p ∧ b ∧¬f
p ∧ b ∧ f p ∧¬b ∧ f p ∧¬b ∧¬f
Note that nothing can be derived from this revised relation concerning non-flying birds:
they may or may not be penguins while, in the original relation, we had b ∧ ¬f |∼¬p:
non-flying birds were likely not to be penguins. If we use natural contraction, we find as
modified ranking
¬p ∧¬b ∧ f ¬p ∧ b ∧ f ¬p ∧¬b ∧¬f p ∧¬b ∧¬f p ∧ b ∧¬f
¬p ∧ b ∧¬f
p ∧ b ∧ f p ∧¬b ∧ f
and we see that, contrarily to what happened previously, we have b ∧ ¬f |∼p: non-flying
birds are likely to be penguins. A new conditional has been added, thus contradicting the
fifth constraint.
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2.3.3. Chain revision
Our problem now will be to add a given preference, say α  β , to the set of rational
preferences that reflects the behavior of an agent. Clearly, the procedure will differ,
depending on whether or not this preference stands ‘in contradiction’ with the original set
of preferences. The intuitive notion of contradiction can be made more precise: naturally,
such a contradiction would result from the presence of β  α among the given set of
preferences of the agent, and there would also be a contradiction if the original set
contained the preference α ¬β , since, by the first derived rule, this would lead to α .
We would still have a contradiction if the set contained β  α∧¬β , for this latter inequality
together with α  β implies α ∨ β  α ∨ β . As a matter of facts, it will turn out that only
this latter case poses a problem. We shall therefore examine first the situation where the
preference β  α ∧ ¬β is not induced by the chain ∆: δ0 	 δ1 	 δ2 	 · · · 	 δh−1 that
represents the agent’s behavior.
In this simple case, the usual terminology is that of an expansion of ∆ by α  β .
Similarly to the notation used in classical revision theory, we shall denote by ∆+ (α  β)
the result of this chain expansion. As follows from the principle of minimal change and
Lemma 2, ∆+ (α  β) should be the smallest super-chain of ∆ that induces α  β , if such
a chain exists.
Let i = r(α). Since we supposed that ∆ does not induce the preference β  α∧¬β , we
do not have β  α, as results from the last derived rule. It follows that δi−1 	¬β . Observe
furthermore that δi is consistent with α∧¬β : otherwise we would have α  α∧¬β , hence
β  α ∧¬β as follows from the third and fifth derived rules.
Consider now the chain ∆′ = δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 (δi ∧ ¬β) 	 δi 	 · · · 	 δh−1
obtained from ∆ by simply adding the link δi ∧ ¬β). We claim that this chain fulfills
all the requirements that were expected from the expansion of ∆ by α  β :
• ∆′ is a chain, as we have δi−1 	¬β .
• ∆′ induces α  β because δi ∧¬β is consistent with α but not with β .
• ∆′ is a minimal extension of ∆ in the sense that:
– one has readily ∆′ =∆ if ∆ entailed α  β ;
– only one link was added to the original chain;
– any link δ such that ∆∪ {δ} entails α  β must satisfy δ 	 (δi ∧¬β).
We shall refer to this chain as ‘the’ expansion of ∆ by α  β and denote it by
∆+ (α  β).
Let us compute the new rank κ ′ = κ∆+ (αβ) induced by this chain: We have h′ = h+1,
and, for any formula γ
r ′(γ )= r(γ ) if r(γ ) < i,
r ′(γ )= r(γ )+ 1 if r(γ ) > i,
r ′(γ )= i if r(γ )= i and γ is consistent with δi ∧¬β,
r ′(γ )= i + 1 if r(γ )= i and γ is inconsistent with δi ∧¬β.
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It follows thatκ ′(γ )=


κ(γ )+ 1 if κ(γ ) > κ(α),
κ(γ ) if κ(α) > κ(γ ),
κ(α)+ 1 if κ(γ )= κ(α) and κ(γ ∧¬β) κ(α),
κ(α) if κ(γ )= κ(α) and κ(γ ∧¬β) < κ(α).
Simply put, this amounts to separating in two the row of the complete formulas with
rank κ(α): the formulas that implied β form a new rank, one notch downward. The other
ones don’t move.
Another way to evaluate this expansion is to compare the induced orders  and
′=∆+ (αβ). One easily finds that for all complete formulas γ and δ, γ ′ δ iff either
γ  δ or α  γ  δ  α, γ 	¬β and δ 	 β .
Let us now translate this result in the context of rational inference relations. We suppose
as given a rational inference relation C , with associated chain ∆, which we want to
expand by the conditional α |∼β . Since this conditional corresponds to the preference
α  α ∧ ¬β , we see by what precedes that this expansion is possible iff one does not
have α ∧¬β  α ∧ β . As this latter preference corresponds to the conditional α |∼¬β , we
conclude that the expansion by α |∼β is possible iff α |∼¬β /∈ C . When this is the case, the
expanded relation is given by the chain
δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 δi ∧ (¬α ∨ β) 	 δi 	 · · · 	 δh−1
where i = r(α). This agrees with the “natural expansion” proposed by Boutilier–
Goldszmidt in their paper.
Example 4. The preferences of the agent being given by the ranking
p ∧ q 2
¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q 1
p ∧¬q 0
with associated chain ∆ = p ∧ q 	 q ∨ ¬p 	 , suppose we want to modify this agent’s
behavior by forcing the new preference ¬p  ¬q . We do not have ¬q  ¬p ∧ q since
κ(¬q) = 1 = κ(¬p ∧ q). A simple expansion is therefore possible and gives rise to the
chain ∆+ (¬p ¬q)= p ∧ q 	 q 	 q ∨¬p 	, with new ranking
p ∧ q 3
¬p ∧ q 2
¬p ∧¬q 1
p ∧¬q 0
We finally turn to the more complicated case where the given chain ∆ induces the
preference β  α∧¬β . As we noticed, it is no longer possible just to make an expansion of
∆ by α  β . The natural way to add this latter preference to our agent’s scheme is thus first
to retract the preference β  α ∧¬β through our contraction procedure, and then to make
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an expansion by α  β . Using the notations of classical revision theory, we shall denote by
∆  (α  β) the resulting chain, that is ∆  (α  β)= (∆÷ (β  α ∧¬β)+ (α  β).
Set i = r(β) and j = r(α∧¬β). The contraction by β  α ∧¬β gives rise to the chain
δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 δj 	 δj+1 	 · · · 	 δh−1.
The first link of this chain that is consistent with α is now δj . Expanding by α  β therefore
provides the revised chain ∆  α  β , which is equal to
δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 (δj ∧¬β)	 δj 	 · · · 	 δh−1.




κ(γ )− κ(β)− κ(α ∧¬β) if κ(γ ) > κ(β),
κ(γ ) if κ(γ ) < κ(α ∧¬β),
κ(α ∧¬β) if κ(α ∧¬β) κ(γ ) κ(β) and γ 	¬β,
κ(α ∧¬β)− 1 if κ(α ∧¬β) κ(γ ) κ(β) and γ 	 β.
These results can be easily translated: the revision by α |∼β of a rational inference
relation C that entails α |∼¬β is readily seen to be given by the chain
δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 δj ∧ (¬α ∨ β) 	 δj 	 · · · 	 δh−1
where i = r(α) and j = r(α ∧ β).
Example 5. The preferences of the agent being still given by the ranking
p ∧ q 2
¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q 1
p ∧¬q 0
with associated chain ∆= p ∧ q 	 q ∨ ¬p 	 , suppose we want to add the preference
¬q  p. Note that ∆ entails the preference p  ¬q ∧ ¬p, that has first to be withdrawn.
We have i = 0, j = 1, and the revised chain ∆ (¬q  p) is therefore ¬p 	 q ∨¬p 	.
The new preference ranking is then given by
¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q 2
p ∧ q 1
p ∧¬q 0
Example 6 (Penguins continued). Let us consider again the rational relation induced by
the ranking
¬p ∧ b ∧ f ¬p ∧¬b ∧ f ¬p ∧¬b ∧¬f
p ∧ b ∧¬f ¬p ∧ b ∧¬f
p ∧ b ∧ f p ∧¬b ∧ f p ∧¬b ∧¬f
with associated chain ¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ) 	 (¬p ∨ b)∧ (¬p ∨¬f ) 	 .
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We note that this relation entails the conditional p ∧ b |∼¬f : indeed the link (¬p ∨
b) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬f ) is consistent with p ∧ b but not with p ∧ b ∧ f . Thus, the belief that
generally penguin-birds don’t fly will be part of our agent’s background. Suppose now we
want to eliminate this belief and replace it by the opposite one, deciding that generally
penguin-birds do fly. We have to perform a revision by p∧ b |∼f . The first link consistent
with p ∧ b is (¬p∨ b)∧ (¬p ∨¬f ) and the first link consistent with p∧ b∧ f is . The
revised chain is therefore ¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ) 	¬p ∨¬b ∨ f 	. The corresponding revised
ranking is then given by
¬p ∧ b ∧ f ¬p ∧¬b ∧ f ¬p ∧¬b ∧¬f
p ∧ b ∧ f ¬p ∧ b ∧¬f p ∧¬b ∧¬f p ∧¬b ∧ f
p ∧ b ∧¬f
Let us look at the result obtained through Boutilier–Goldszmidt method: to contract by
p ∧ b |∼f we raise p ∧ b ∧ f to the rank of p ∧ b ∧ ¬f . This leads to the contracted
chain ¬p∧ (¬b∨f ) 	¬p∨b 	 . The subsequent expansion by p∧b |∼f gives as final
result the chain ¬p∧ (¬b∨ f ) 	 ¬p∨ (b∧ f ) 	¬p∨ b 	 . Note that this chain entails
the conditionals p ∧ f |∼b and p ∧ ¬f |∼b: flying penguins became birds, which they
were originally not. In the more cautious chain revision procedure, the original conditional
p |∼b was eliminated during the contraction process, and adding the desired conditional
p ∧ b |∼f was not enough to get it back.
2.4. Iterated and simultaneous revision of complete preference sets
Up till now, we have dealt with the problem of revising a complete set P of preferences
in order to incorporate in it a single preference α  β . The problem of iterated revision
comes when, this having been done, it appears desirable to revise the new preference set
by a second preference, say γ  δ. This is quite naturally possible by revising, through the
method set out above, the set P  (α  β) by γ  δ. Thus, the solution simply amounts to
taking the set (P  (α  β))  (γ  δ) as resulting preference set. If the preference α  β
happens to disappear in the process, this is totally justified by the choice of the sequence in
which we decide to make the revisions. Revising by γ  δ only after the revision by α  β
has been performed is interpreted as: the requirement to get the preference γ  δ takes
place after that concerning the preference α  β , and must therefore be considered as more
important or more reliable than the latter. In this perspective, where former information
or constraints may become obsolete, there is no contradiction nor harm in giving up a
preference that contradicts the new one, even if the former was inserted in the initial
preference set by means of a revision process.
Nevertheless, it may well be the case that one wishes to add both preferences α  β
and γ  δ to the initial preference set. This of course could be done via the single revision
by α ∧ γ  β ∨ δ, as this preference implies both α  β and γ  δ, but this might be an
excessive method—think for instance of the case where α ∧ γ is inconsistent.
To fix ideas a bit and show the type of problem we have to deal with, we consider the
following situation.
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2.4.1. Cervantes puzzles
Cervantes decides he wants to compose a novel, the principal character of which will
be Don Quixote de la Mancha. The author has not yet decided what the action will be, and
he first tries to settle the portrait of his hero, his temper, his passions and goals. For this
purpose, Cervantes starts from a flat model, not to have any pre-conceived ideas. To make
things easy, in a first approach he considers that his hero will act determined by only three
fundamental criteria: the preservation of life (l), the desire for wealth (w) and the quest for
glory and adventure (g). Thus at the beginning, Cervantes displays on his white sheet, in
a single row, the eight complete formulas corresponding to these items and considers this
flat preference set, with its associated trivial chain δ0 =.
Puzzle 1. Cervantes thinks of a character who, rather than wealth, would prize glory over
all, being willing even to sacrifice his life in his quest for glory and adventure. It seems clear
to the author that he should add the preferences ¬w  ¬l and ¬l  ¬g to Don Quixote’s
preference set. He therefore proceeds to a first expansion by ¬w  ¬l, which yields the
chain l 	. Now this chain induces the preference ¬g ¬l ∧ g, as ¬g is consistent with
l while ¬l ∧ g is not. Therefore, the second desired revision by ¬l  ¬g first requires a
contraction by ¬g  ¬l ∧ g; the final result provides the chain g 	 , in which the author
no longer finds the preference ¬w ¬l.
Fortunately, a third revision of this latter chain by ¬w ¬l, a simple expansion in this
case, finally leads to the chain g ∧ l 	 g 	 that entails both desired preferences ¬l ¬g
and ¬w ¬l. Furthermore Cervantes notices that a double revision would have lead to the
same result, simply beginning by ¬l ¬g instead of ¬w ¬l.
The first sketch of Don Quixote’s preference set is then given by the ranking
g ∧ l ∧¬w g ∧ l ∧w 2
g ∧¬l ∧¬w g ∧¬l ∧w 1
¬g ∧¬l ∧¬w ¬g ∧¬l ∧w ¬g ∧ l ∧¬w ¬g ∧ l ∧w 0
Puzzle 2. Still willing to keep the preference ¬w  ¬l in his hero’s preference set,
Cervantes now wishes to replace the preference ¬l  ¬g by the simpler g  l (Don
Quixote prizes glory more than life). Starting again from the trivial chain which he expands
by¬w ¬l, the writer notes, though, that the expanded chain l 	  induces the preference
l  g∧¬l. To revise by ¬l ¬g, it is therefore necessary to make a contraction. The final
result is the chain ¬l 	 , which no longer entails ¬w ¬l.
Remembering the preceding situation, Cervantes decides to invert the order and revise
by g  l before revising by ¬w  ¬l. Alas, this does not work anymore: expansion by g
 l first leads to the chain ¬l 	, and subsequent revision by ¬w ¬l provides the chain
l 	  that no longer entails g  l.
It seems that there is no way to force the two preferences ¬w ¬l and l  g ∧¬l into
Don Quixote’s preference set. . . . And indeed, after thinking this over, Cervantes notices
that these two preferences cannot coexist in a single preference set as, together, they would
imply l ∨w  . . . .
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Puzzle 3. At this point, Cervantes realizes that he’d better start with a non-trivial chain,
and since he wants Don Quixote to adopt as motto ‘Glory or Death’, he decides that this
chain will just be g∨¬l 	. Realizing thereafter that the interest of his novel could gain a
lot if he introduced, be it only in his hero’s mind, a feminine character, he decides that the
behavior of Don Quixote should also be much influenced by his relations with his Dulciana
(d), and the desire to win her heart. To make things more manageable, the novelist puts
aside for a while the part of Don Quixote’s universe that has to do with wealth (w), leaving
just him with the three fundamentals d , g and l. The initial ranking issued from the chain
g ∨¬l 	  thus becomes
d ∧ g ∧ l ¬d ∧¬g ∧¬l d ∧¬g ∧¬l ¬d ∧ g ∧¬l d ∧ g ∧¬l g ∧¬d ∧ l 1
d ∧¬g ∧ l ¬d ∧¬g ∧ l 0
Now, Don Quixote’s subsequent behavior may be determined by two features: the first
one is that, all things being otherwise equal, he prefers to stay alive (¬l); the second
is that he prizes more his Dulciana than his quest for glory and adventure (d  g), as
these are only searched in order to win Dulciana’s heart. These preference items should be
therefore introduced in the set of Don Quixote’s preferences. But the revision by ¬l,
a simple expansion, leads to the chain g ∧ l 	 g ∨ ¬l 	 , and the subsequent revision
by d  g, which requires first a contraction by g  d ∧ ¬g, finally leads to the chain
¬g ∧ ¬l 	 g ∨ ¬l 	  that no longer entails   ¬l. Cervantes, in a first attempt to
recover this preference proceeds to a third and, he hopes, a last revision by   ¬l. But
this first requires a contraction by ¬l  l, and the result after revision by   ¬l yields
back the chain g ∧ l 	 g ∨ ¬l 	 . At this point, it is clear that it won’t be possible
to integrate both preferences   ¬l and d  g to the original chain g ∨ ¬l 	  by a
simple iteration of revisions. . . . Does this come, wonders Cervantes, from the fact that,
as in the preceding case, there exists a contradiction between these preferences? After
some unsuccessful attempts to detect it, he notices, though, that these preferences are both
entailed by the chain¬g∧ l 	, a chain that he obviously can’t get from the one he started
unless he finds a new revision procedure. But then, he thinks, this would be at the cost of
the principles of minimal change that seemed to him so natural. . . .
2.4.2. Simultaneous revision reduced to iterated revision
The Cervantes puzzles illustrate the difficulties that may be encountered when we try
to revise the set of preferences of an agent in order to get a new set that would contain
two given preferences α  β and γ  δ. How can we approach these difficulties in general
terms?
We suppose that the initial preference set is induced by a chain ∆: δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δh−1,
and our purpose is to determine whether it is possible to transform this chain by a
succession of iterated revisions so that the resulting chain entails both preferences α  β
and α′  β ′.
We may restrict ourselves to the case where ∆ entails α  β because, anyway, this will
be the case for the revised chain ∆′ =∆  (α  β).
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We set i = r(α)= r(α ∧¬β), j = r(β), j ′ = r(β ′) and k = r(α′ ∧ ¬β ′). Let us make
the ‘impossibility’ hypothesis that no transformation of ∆ through successive revisions by
α  β and α′  β ′ will induce at the same time these two preferences.
The chain ∆ then necessarily entails β ′  α′ ∧¬β ′, otherwise revision by α′  β ′ would
be a simple expansion, preserving α  β . We have therefore j ′ < k and the revised chain
∆  (α  β) is
δ0 	 · · · 	 δj ′−1 	 δk ∧¬β ′ 	 δk 	 · · · 	 δh−1.
By our hypothesis, this chain no longer entails α  β , and this implies readily that
j ′  i < j  k. Moreover, this chain entails β  α ∧ ¬β , since otherwise, making an
expansion by α  β would lead to a chain inducing both preferences. Since δk is consistent
with α, we must have δk ∧¬β ′ consistent with β , and δk is thus the first link of the revised
chain that is β consistent. Also, as we saw, this link must be inconsistent with α ∧¬β .
Revising then by α  β yields the chain (∆  (α′ ∧ ¬β ′))  (α  β) δ0 	 · · · 	 δj ′−1 	
δk ∧¬β 	 δk 	 · · · 	 δh−1.
Applying again our hypothesis concerning the impossibility to get at the same time our
two preferences, we see that this chain does not entail α′  β ′ but entails β ′  α′ ∧ ¬β ′.
Thus δk ∧¬β must be inconsistent with α′ ∧ ¬β ′. As a last attempt to revise this chain by
α′ ∧¬β ′ leads back to the previous ∆ (α′ ∧¬β ′), we see that our impossibility condition
is equivalent to the conjunction of three conditions, namely j ′  i < j  k, δk is consistent
with β ∧¬β ′, and δk inconsistent with α∧¬β ∧¬β ′ and with α′ ∧¬β ∧¬β ′. Translating
all this in terms of preference ranking, we obtain the
Theorem 2. Let P be a complete set of preferences, α  β a preference of P and α′  β ′
an arbitrary preference. Then it is possible to modify P through iterated revisions and
obtain both α  β and α′  β ′ iff one at least of the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) α  β ′.
(2) α′ ∧ ¬β ′  β .
(3) α′ ∧ ¬β ′  (α ∨ α′)∧¬β ∧¬β ′.
The above result therefore provides a criterion to test whether two given preferences
may be together incorporated through iterated revisions into the preference set of an agent.
If none of the three conditions stated in Theorem 2 is satisfied, it is impossible to revise
the original preference set and get both preferences together. It may be the case that these
two new preferences are mutually exclusive, as in Cervantes Puzzle 2, but, as we saw in
Puzzle 3, it may also be the case that the revision procedure we used is inadequate to
treat the general problem of multiple revision. In its all generality, this problem amounts
to the following one: once given the preference set P of an agent and a consistent set K
of preferences, determine a procedure that would enable to build a new preference set P ′
that includes K and would differ as little as possible from P . Note that, equivalently, this
problem could also be viewed as that of a single revision of P by a preference α  β with
the constraint that a given subset K of P has to be preserved.
It is doubtful whether a generalization of Theorem 2 could provide practical results in
the case where K has more than two or three elements. But, above all, it seems that this
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constraint problem (preserving a given preference base K) does not fall in the context of
iterated revision, where the new preferences to be added or retracted are taken one by one in
a sequence that is the essential part of the revision process, the last preference to be treated
being supposed to be more reliable than the preceding ones. Thus the constraint problem
requires a study of its own for which the results established in the preceding sections are
of little help. A different approach will be proposed in the last section of this paper.
3. The revision of knowledge bases and incomplete preference sets
So far, chain representation of rational inferences and preferences proved to be the right
tool to use. It enabled us to solve without drawbacks or shortcomings the problem of revis-
ing rational relations and preference orders. However its domain is a priori limited to the
cases where we dispose of a complete information on the state of the world: all our study
was made supposing that, given two items, one knows whether one of them is or is not pre-
ferred to the other. The set of preferences of the agent was thus supposed to be a complete
preference set: the rank of every formula is known so that, given α and β , one always knows
if the conditional α |∼β holds, that is if the agent is ready to jump from the premise α to
the conclusion β . Clearly, the methods we proposed cannot apply as such to incomplete
sets of preferences or arbitrary sets of conditionals: to begin with, this comes from the fact
that, technically, these methods are based on a representation by logical chains of ranked
orders that do not usually exist among arbitrary sets of preferences. But, above all, we have
to be more precise when we speak of revising the information conveyed by a knowledge
base. Indeed knowledge bases are mainly, if not only, studied in the perspective of default
extension, that is in as much as they can be embedded into a complete set of information
formalized, for instance, by a rational consistent inference relation. They are thus tightly
linked, almost identified, with their extension and, in most studies, only considered as
some raw material that eventually may contribute to the construction of rational inference
relations. For this reason there exists some ambiguity in the meaning of discarding a con-
ditional from a given knowledge base: when we decide for instance that some conditional
that was part of our original base has to be retracted, does that just mean we are looking for
a new base in which this conditional should not lie, or, more radically, that we want to build
a base in the extension of which our conditional should no longer lie? To take a trivial ex-
ample, suppose that our original knowledge base consists of the three conditionals penguin
are birds, birds fly and penguins fly, and that we learn afterwards that the last conditional is
questionable, so that we have to contract by this conditional. We may perform our revision
by simply discarding the conditional penguins fly from our knowledge base, and take as
new base the set {p |∼b, b |∼f }. But then it turns out that the conditional p |∼f still re-
mains entailed by all the extensions, at least the reasonable extensions, of this revised base.
This may not be a drawback if the contraction by p |∼f was decided as a simple caution,
on the ground for instance that we had doubts about the authenticity or the integrity of
the message encoded by our source. But it will surely be a shortcoming if our decision of
contracting was motivated by real doubts about the ability of penguins to fly, or because ex-
perienced ornithologists told us of their conviction that penguins don’t fly. Then, the simple
base-revision procedure is totally inefficient: on one hand we do not want the conditional
M. Freund / Artificial Intelligence 152 (2004) 105–137 127
p |∼f to be entailed by any extension of our revised base, and on the other one we do not
want either to give up the remaining information encoded by the two first conditionals.
In this paper, we shall adopt the perspective of a “strong” revision, where we focus our
attention on the default-extensions, rather than that of a “mild” revision that only deals
with the knowledge bases. Thus, the contraction of a base by a conditional, should lead to
a new base, the extension of which is required no longer to imply the given conditional.
We speak of “the” extension of a conditional knowledge base because, for its simplicity,
our framework will be that of rational closure, whose construction will be recalled in the
next section.
As a first approach, the problem seems to have an easy solution: to perform the
contraction, by the conditional α |∼β , of the conditional base K that has C for rational
closure, simply perform the chain-contraction of C as defined in Section 2.3.2. Doing this,
though, would violate the so-called categorial matching principle (see [10]), according to
which the representation of a belief state after a belief change has taken place should be
in the same format as its representation before the change. In other words, the revision of
the conditional base K through its rational closure should provide as last item a (revised)
conditional base, the rational closure of which should be equal to the revision C of C by
α |∼β . Now, how and on what grounds shall we choose, among the numerous bases of C
the one that deserves to be considered as the revision of K by α |∼β? Surely, we would
be tempted to apply some general principles analogous to those that we established in the
framework of conditional revision, but it turns out that this is generally not possible. To see
this, suppose for instance we are in the simple case where we have a conditional knowledge
base K ′ with rational closure C ′, and a conditional α |∼β that is a member of C ′ but not of
K ′. Let K be the base K ′ ∪ {α |∼β} and consider the problem of contractingK by α |∼β .
Then, on the one hand, by the success and minimal change principles, we should get as
revised base the base K ′. On the other hand, the resulting closure C ′ of this revised base
should agree with the contraction of the rational closure C of K , and therefore not have
α |∼β as a member, which contradicts our choice of α |∼β . Therefore it is hopeless to look
for a revision process that would plainly respect at both the base and the extension levels
the “natural” principles of success and minimal change.
There exists a particular domain, though, where base-revision may be performed
through ordinary conditional revision: it is that of canonical bases. But before defining
these bases and studying their properties, we first need to recall some basic facts concerning
the rational closure of knowledge bases.
3.1. Conditional knowledge bases and their rational closure
A conditional base K is a set of pairs (αi,βi ), where each pair is to be read as: “if
αi , then generally βi”. Such a pair is called a conditional assertion, or a conditional,
and is usually written as αi |∼βi . The material counterpart of αi |∼βi is the formula
α → β = ¬α ∨ β . In the finite case where we are working, we can define the material
counterpart  K of K as the conjunction of the material counterpart of its elements.
The classical problem of default extension is to determine and build a suitable rational
inference relation C such that K ∈ C . Several solutions exist but, in the present paper, we
will be only interested in the so called rational closure proposed by Lehmann and Magidor
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[8]: following their terminology, we will say that a formula α is exceptional for a set A of
conditional assertions iff α is inconsistent with the material counterpart A¯ of A. Similarly,
we will say that a conditional α |∼β is exceptional for A if its antecedent α is exceptional
for A, that is if A¯ 	¬α.
The rational closure CK of K was the first system to be proposed and seems to be
an optimal compromise between adequacy and tractability. The reader may refer to the
original paper of Lehmann and Magidor or to the equivalent system Z of Pearl [9]. We will
briefly recall the construction of this rational closure: we define inductively the sets K i by
K0 = K and, for all i , K i+1 as the set of all elements of K i that are exceptional for K i .
The conditional base K is assumed to be consistent, insuring that the K i ’s form a strictly
decreasing sequence. We will refer to this sequence as to the LM-sequence. Its total length
h is the height of K ; we have thus Kh−1 = ∅. For each index i , set δi =  K i . The rational
closure CK of K is then the rational inference relation that is represented by the chain (δi)
of length h (see [3, Theorem 24] for details). We shall say that K is a base for CK . Such a
base is said to entail a conditional if this conditional is an element of its rational closure.
It is not difficult to prove that K is a subset of CK , and that CK is the rational closure of
K ∪ {α |∼β} for any element α |∼β of CK .
Remark 2. The duality between preference orders and rational inference relations can be
easily transposed to incomplete ordering structures. If P is a set of pairs αi  βi , we can
define the rational closure of P as that of the corresponding set K = {αi ∨ βi |∼¬βi}i .
Note that the material counterpart of such a set is then equal to
∧
i ¬βi .
Remark 3. Let α |∼β be an element of K and i such that α |∼β ∈ K i −K i+1. Then we
see that i is the first index such that α is consistent with δi . In other words, using our
preceding notation, we have i = r(α). We will also denote this index i by r(α |∼β). For
any conditional α |∼β of K , we have therefore r(α |∼β)= r(α).
Example 7 (Penguins triangle). SupposeK consists of the three conditionals p |∼b, b |∼f
and p |∼¬f . We have then
K0 = {p |∼b, b |∼f,p |∼¬f }, δ0 =¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ),
K1 = {p |∼b,p |∼¬f }, δ1 = (¬p ∨ b)∧ (¬p ∨¬f ),
K2 = ∅, δ2 =,
r(p |∼b)= r(p |∼¬f )= 1 and r(b |∼f )= 0.
3.2. Minimal bases
It is clear from the construction of the sequence (δi) that if the knowledge base K has
n elements, the height of its rational closure CK is at most equal to n+ 1. Given a rational
inference relation C of height h, we shall say that K is a minimal base for C if it has for
closure C and for cardinal h − 1. We shall say that a set K is a minimal base if its is a
minimal base of its rational closure. Note that the penguins triangle base {p |∼b, b |∼f ,
p |∼¬f } is not minimal since its number of elements is equal to the height of its closure.
Let us first show that minimal bases always exist.
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Theorem 3. Let C be a rational consistent inference relation, and ∆: δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δh−1
its associated chain. Then the set B = { |∼ δ0,¬δ0 |∼ δ1,¬δ1 |∼ δ2, . . . ,¬δh−3 |∼ δh−2} is
a minimal base for C .
Proof. Straightforward, computing the LM-sequence of B. ✷
We shall call the set B the canonical base of C . Thus we see that in the penguins
triangle example, the base {p |∼b, b |∼f,p |∼¬f } with three elements can be replaced
by the minimal one B = { |∼¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ),p ∨ (b ∧ ¬f ) |∼ (¬p ∨ b) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬f )}
that has only two elements.
Minimal bases play an interesting role in the framework of conditional revision: deleting
an element from a minimal base ensures that this element will not be entailed by its rational
closure:
Lemma 3. Let K be a minimal base, C its closure and α |∼β an element of K . Denote by
K ′ the set-theoretic contraction of K by α |∼β , that is K ′ =K − {α |∼β}. Then K ′ does
not entail α |∼β .
Proof. If α |∼β was an element of the closure of K ′, this closure would agree with the
closure of K ′ ∪ {α |∼β} = K , and K ′ would be therefore a base for C , contradicting the
minimality of K . ✷
The above result shows that any deletion performed on a minimal base yields a
contraction on its rational closure. Nevertheless this operation generally no longer yields
a minimal base, so that the principle of categorial matching does not apply to minimal
bases because a subset of a minimal base need not be itself a minimal base. Consider for
instance the set K = { |∼p,¬p ∨ ¬f |∼f,¬f |∼¬b}. Then one easily checks that its
rational closure is represented by the chain p∧ f 	 f 	 b∨ f 	, so that K is a minimal
base. Nevertheless the subset of two elements { |∼p,¬f |∼¬b} generates the relation
represented by the chain of height 2 equal to p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ) 	 . This subset is therefore
no longer a minimal base.
The following provides an alternative definition of minimal bases:
Theorem 4. Let K be a set of conditional assertions, h its height and (δi) the chain
associated with its rational closure. Then the following properties are equivalent:
(1) K is a minimal base.
(2) For any pair α |∼β and γ |∼ δ of different elements ofK , one has r(α |∼β) = r(γ |∼ δ).
(3) For any index i < h− 1, the set K i −K i+1 has only one element.
When these properties are satisfied, one has ¬α∨β = δr(α |∼β) for every element α |∼β
of K .
Proof. If K is minimal, it has h − 1 elements. The map that associates with every
conditional α |∼β ∈ K its pseudo-rank r(α |∼β) is a surjection from K onto the set
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{0,1, . . . , h− 2} and therefore a one-to-one mapping. From this follows that for any index
i < h− 1, there exists exactly one conditional α |∼β ∈K such that r(α)= i , showing that
K i −K i+1 = {α |∼β}. The fact that, for all i < h− 1, K i −K i+1 is a singleton readily
implies that K has h− 1 elements. ✷
An interesting property of minimal bases is that they can be used to make some surgery
on other bases:
Theorem 5. Let K and K ′ be two bases for the rational inference relation C , represented
by a chain (δi). Suppose that K is minimal. Let α′ |∼β ′ be an arbitrary element of K ′
and α |∼β the unique conditional of K such that r(α |∼β)= r(α′ |∼β ′). Then the set K ′′
obtained by replacing in K ′ the conditional α′ |∼β ′ by α |∼β is again a base for C .
Proof. Let (K ′i ) and (K ′′i ) be the LM-sequences of K ′ and K ′′. Set j = r(α |∼β) =
r(α′ |∼β ′). If j = 0, we can write (K ′0)=A∪ {α′ |∼β ′}, and (K ′′0)=A∪ {α |∼β}. Taking
the material counterpart, we get  K ′0 = δ0 = A¯ ∧ (¬α′ ∨ β ′) and  K ′′0 = A¯ ∧ δj . We have
δ0 	 δj , and, by construction, δj 	 α′ |∼β ′. It follows that  K ′′0 =  K ′0 = δ0. If j > 1, this
latter equality implies that the set K ′′1 is obtained from K ′1 by replacing α′ |∼β ′ by α |∼β ,
and that  K ′′1 =  K ′1 = δ1. Similarly, we find  K ′′i =  K ′i = δi for all i  j . Since we have
readily K ′′i = K ′i for i > j , we see that the chain induced by K ′′ is the chain (δi) as
claimed. ✷
The above result is no longer true if K is not minimal. For instance, in the penguins
triangle example, replacing the conditional p |∼b by the conditional of same rank p |∼¬f
yields the base {b |∼f,p |∼¬f } the associated chain of which, (¬b∨f )∧(¬p∨¬f ) 	,
different from the original one.
Note an immediate generalization of Theorem 5: iterating the process, we can choose
an arbitrary number of elements of K ′ that have different rank and replace them one by
one by the element of corresponding rank that lies in K . The resulting set will be again a
base for C .
Corollary 1 (Base completion). Let C be a rational consistent inference relation,
with associated chain (δi) and B = { |∼δ0,¬δ0 |∼ δ1,¬δ1 |∼ δ2, . . . ,¬δh−3 |∼ δh−2} its
canonical base. Let α1 |∼β1, α2 |∼β2, . . . , αn |∼βn be n conditionals (n < h) with different
ranks ri = r(αi). Then the set {α1 |∼β1, α2 |∼β2, . . . , αn |∼βn} can be completed into a
minimal base for C if and only if the set obtained from B by replacing each conditional
¬δri−1 |∼ δri by αi |∼βi is itself a base for C .
Proof. Immediate by Theorem 5. ✷
We shall say that a set of conditionals {α1 |∼β1, α2 |∼β2, . . . , αn |∼βn} is a free system
in C (or more briefly that these conditionals are free) if this set is part of a minimal base
for C .
The following result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a single
conditional to be free:
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Theorem 6. Let C be a rational consistent inference relation represented by the chain (δi)
and α |∼β an element of C . Then α |∼β is free iff one has δr(α) = (¬α ∨ β)∧ δr(α)+1.
Proof. Let j = r(α). By the above corollary, α |∼β is part of a minimal base for C iff K
is a base for C , where K is the set
{ |∼ δ0,¬δ0 |∼ δ1, . . . ,¬δj−2 |∼ δj−1, α |∼β, . . . ,¬δh−3 |∼ δh−2}.
Computing its associated LM-sequence and the corresponding material counterparts, we
find  K i = δi for all i = j and  Kj = (¬α ∨ β) ∧ δj+1. We must have therefore δj =
(¬α ∨ β)∧ δj+1 as claimed. ✷
Example 8. Taking again the penguins example, we see that the conditional b |∼f is
free: we have indeed (¬b ∨ f ) ∧ (¬p ∨ b) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬f ) = ¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ) = δ0.
Similarly, the conditional p |∼ (b ∧¬f ) is also free, since ¬p ∨ (b ∧¬f )= δ1. Applying
Theorem 5, we see that {b |∼f,p |∼ (b∧¬f )} is a (minimal) base for the rational closure of
{b |∼f,p |∼b,p |∼¬f }. Note though that the conditional p |∼b is not free for this closure,
as we do not have ¬p ∨ b = δ1.
3.3. Canonical base revision
We can now return to the problem of revising an incomplete structure. As we mentioned,
revising a conditional base by applying chain revision to its rational closure may lead to
counterintuitive results and furthermore violates the principle of categorial matching. The
chain-revision procedure is therefore of little use in the general context of base-revision
problems. Even if we restrict our domain to that of minimal bases, there is no hope that
we could perform a well-defined minimal base revision by just operating on its rational
closure. First, this may again violate the categorial matching principle, since a subset of
a minimal base is not necessarily minimal itself; but furthermore, even if the contracted
base is minimal, there is no reason that its closure should agree with the contraction of
the original closure. For instance take again the penguins triangle: we know that the bases
{b |∼f,p |∼b∧¬f } and { |∼¬p∧ (¬b∨f ),p |∼b∧¬f } have the same rational closure
C , and that they are both minimal bases for C . Performing a chain contraction by p |∼b ∧
¬f cannot yield a relation that would be at the same time the closure of {b |∼f } and that
of { |∼¬p∧ (¬b∨f )}, since these bases have different closures. . . . To ensure that short-
comings of this type won’t occur, we will have to focus on some specific minimal bases.
3.3.1. Free conditional contraction
The technique of chain-revision can be applied when dealing with free conditionals and
canonical bases. Let us first define the revision of a base K by a free conditional α |∼β in
the following way:
Definition 1. Let K be a conditional base with rational closure C , α |∼β a free conditional
in K and B the canonical base associated with C . Set i = r(α). Then the contraction of K
by α |∼β is defined as the set-theoretic contraction of B by ¬δi−1 |∼ δi .
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Example 9. Let us take for K the base {p |∼b, b |∼f,p |∼¬f }. The base-contraction
of K by the free conditional b |∼f is the set consisting of the single conditional {p ∨
(b ∧ ¬f ) |∼ (¬p ∨ b) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬f )}. Note that its rational closure is given by the chain
¬p ∧ (b ∧ ¬f ) 	 , and that this chain is the contraction of the original chain by the
conditional b |∼f .
We can now study the link between the operation of base contraction and that of chain
contraction.
Theorem 7. Let K be a conditional base with rational closure C and α |∼β a free
conditional in K . Then the contraction of K by the conditional α |∼β is a minimal base
that has for rational closure the chain contraction C ÷ (α |∼β) of C by α |∼β .
Proof. Set i = r(α). By Theorem 6 we have (¬α ∨ β) ∧ δi+1 = δi . It follows that
δi+1 is consistent with α ∧ ¬β , otherwise we would have δi = δi+1. We have therefore
r(α ∧ ¬β) = i + 1. By what we saw in Section 2.3.2, the revision of C by α |∼β is
represented by the chain
δ0 	 δ1 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 δi+1 	 · · · 	 ,
the associated canonical base of which is readily equal to the set-theoretic contraction of
the canonical base B by ¬δi−1 |∼ δi . ✷
3.3.2. Minimal base expansion and revision
In base contraction, the main difficulty was that retracting a conditional from a base did
not guarantee that this conditional is retracted from its rational closure. Compared to this,
base expansion poses no real problem: we are given a conditional base K with rational
closure C and we want to incorporate in it a new conditional α |∼β . Since a conditional
base is always embedded in its closure, the rational closure of K ∪ {α |∼β} will entail
α |∼β , as desired, and the expanded base K ∪ {α |∼β} therefore provides quite a simple
solution.
Several objections may nevertheless be raised against this elementary base expansion
process. The first one concerns the link that may exist between the expansion of a base
and the chain-expansion of its rational closure: when will they agree? The second one
poses the question of the respect of the categorial matching principle for minimal base:
if the initial base was minimal, will the expanded base still be minimal? Finally, another
problem may be encountered in the case where the initial base remains unknown: all what
we have at disposal is a rational consistent inference relation C , which we want to revise
by a conditional α |∼β : is it then possible to expand C in such a way that α |∼β becomes
part of a minimal base for this expansion?
It is immediate that the chain-expansion of the closure of K does not generally agree
with the closure of the expansion of K . For instance, suppose K consists of the single
conditional |∼ δ; its closure is then represented by the chain δ 	 . On one hand,
supposing that δ is consistent with α, the chain-expansion by α |∼β yields δ ∧ (¬α ∨ β) 	
δ 	 . On the other hand, excepted the limit case where δ ∧ (¬α ∨ β) is inconsistent with
α, the closure of { |∼δ,α |∼β} is given by the chain δ∧ (¬α∨β) 	 , which differs from
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the preceding one. Furthermore this simple example shows at the same time that expanding
a minimal (and even a canonical) base (here, the singleton { |∼ δ}) by a conditional does
not provide a minimal base: the height of the closure of { |∼ δ,α |∼β} is equal to 2.
The easiest way to address the problems evoked above is, again, to work in the
framework of canonical bases. We shall first build a copy of the canonical base that will
contain an element close enough to the conditional that has to be added. More precisely,
we define the expansion of K by α |∼β as follows:
Definition 2. Let K be a conditional base with rational closure C and α |∼β a conditional
such that α |∼¬β is not in C . Set i = r(α). Denote by B′ the base obtained from the
canonical base B by replacing the conditional ¬δi−1 |∼ δi by ¬δi ∨ (α ∧ ¬β) |∼δi (if
i = h − 1, we just set B′ = B). We define the expansion K + α |∼β of K by α |∼β to
be the set-theoretic expansion B′ ∪ {α |∼β} of B′ by α |∼β}.
Note that by Theorem 6 the conditional ¬δi ∨ (α ∧ ¬β) |∼ δi is free for C . It follows
therefore from Theorem 5 that the set B ′ is a minimal base for C . The link between base
expansion and chain expansion is given by the
Theorem 8. With the above notations, the closure of the expanded base B′ ∪{α |∼β} agrees
with the chain-expansion C + {α |∼β} of C by {α |∼β}. Furthermore this expanded base is
minimal.
Proof. We recall (cf. Section 2.3.3) that C + {α |∼β} is represented by the chain
δ0 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 δi ∧ (¬α ∨ β) 	 δi 	 · · · 	 .
Let us compute the LM-sequence of K + α |∼β . For j < i , the j th term of this sequence
is the set
{¬δj |∼ δj+1, . . . ,¬δi−2 |∼ δi−1, α |∼β,¬δi ∨ (α ∧¬β) |∼δi,¬δi |∼ δi+1, . . .}.
It follows that its material counterpart is equal to δj . The ith term of this sequence is
{α |∼β,¬δi∨(α∧¬β) |∼ δi,¬δi |∼ δi+1, . . .}, with material counterpart equal to δi∧(¬α∨
β), showing that α is not exceptional for this set. We conclude that the (i+1)th term of the
LM sequence is equal to {¬δi ∨ (α∧¬β) |∼δi,¬δi |∼ δi+1 . . .}, and its material counterpart
equal to δi . The next terms of the sequence (for j > i+1) are identical to the corresponding
ones of the canonical base. It follows that the chain associated with K + α |∼β is equal to
δ0 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 δi ∧ (¬α ∨ β) 	 δi 	 · · · 	 
as claimed. ✷
Example 10. We take forK the base {p |∼b, b |∼f,p |∼¬f } which we want to expand by
the conditional b ∧ ¬f |∼¬p (non-flying birds are generally not penguins). Neither this
conditional nor its opposite b ∧¬f |∼p are entailed by the chain
¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ) 	 (¬p ∨ (b ∧¬f ) 	
that models the rational closure of K . The associated canonical base B is the set
{ |∼¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ),p ∨ (b ∧¬f ) |∼ (¬p ∨ b)∧ (¬p ∨¬f )}. We have r(b ∧¬f )= 1,
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and we see, after simplification, that the expansion of K by b ∧ ¬f |∼¬p is the set
{b ∧¬f |∼¬p,|∼¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ),p |∼¬p ∨ (b ∧ (¬f ). Its LM-sequence is
K ′0 =K ′,
K ′1 = {b ∧¬f |∼¬p,p |∼¬p ∨ (b ∧ (¬f ))},
K ′2 = {p |∼¬p ∨ (b ∧ (¬f ))}.
The associated chain is¬p∧(¬b∨f ) 	¬p 	 (¬p∨(b∧¬f ) 	 ,which corresponds
to the chain-expansion of the original chain by b ∧¬f |∼¬p.
We finally turn to the case where we dispose of a base K that entails the conditional
α |∼¬β and we want to build from K a new base that contains α |∼β . To do so, we will
first make a base-contraction in order to eliminate α |∼¬β and thereafter build the base-
expansion by α |∼β . Note that this requires that the conditional α |∼¬β is free for C , that is
(Theorem 6) that δr(α) = (¬α∨¬β)∧ δr(α)+1. When this condition is satisfied, we simply
define the base-revision ofK by α |∼β as the result of the contraction by α |∼¬β followed
by the expansion by α |∼β . Clearly the rational closure of this base agrees with the chain-
revision of the rational closure ofK . The revised base is minimal in this closure. It is equal
to
{ |∼ δ0, . . . ,¬δi−2 |∼ δi−1,¬δi+1 ∨ (α ∧¬β) |∼δi+1, α |∼β,¬δi+1 |∼ δi+2, . . .}.
4. Simultaneous revision
As we saw, canonical bases play quite an important role in the theory of conditional
bases. They can also be used in the research of a solution to the problem, evoked at the end
of Section 2.4.2, of simultaneous revision or revision with constraints. Let us recall that this
problem is the following one: we are given a rational consistent inference relation C , and we
would like to revise it by a set of conditionalsK . Compared to the initial inference relation,
that is supposed to model an agent’s behavior,K represents some “new” and probably more
reliable information. When trying to solve this problem, we noticed that even in the simple
case where the set K has only two elements, iterated revision may reveal hazardous (see
Cervantes Puzzle 1) or totally inefficient (Cervantes Puzzle 3). We shall propose now an
alternative solution closely related to what we have seen in the framework of base-revision.
Our main hypothesis will be that the given set K may be treated as a consistent
conditional base: we consider that, independently from C , the set K itself conveys partial
but pertinent information about the agent’s behavior. We therefore suppose that it admits
a strictly decreasing LM-sequence, and hence a rational closure. In order to define the
revision of C byK , we will consider that the information conveyed by this latter set is more
reliable than the one initially given by C: in case of conflict, the base K will be preferred
to the original rational inference relation C . This leads to the following definition.
Definition 3. Let Ci be the ith term of the LM-sequence associated with the canonical base
BC of the relation C . The revision C K of C by K is the rational closure of the set Ci ∪K ,
where i is the first index such that Ci ∪K admits a rational closure.
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To illustrate this definition, let us consider the simple case where K consists of a
single conditional α |∼β . Let (δi)i<h be the chain associated with C and set i = r(α)
and j = r(α ∧ β). We suppose furthermore that we have i < j , that is α |∼¬β ∈ C . Set
L= BC ∪ {α |∼β} and Li the ith term of its LM-sequence. We have then:
L0 = {α |∼β,|∼δ0,¬δ0 |∼ δ1, . . . ,¬δh−3 |∼ δh−2}, L0 = δ0,
. . .
Li−1 = {α |∼β,¬δi−2 |∼ δi−1, . . . ,¬δh−3 |∼ δh−2}, Li−1 = δi−1,
Li = {α |∼β,¬δi−1 |∼ δi, . . . ,¬δh−3 |∼ δh−2}, Li = δi ∧ (¬α ∨ β),
. . .
Lj = {α |∼β,¬δj |∼ δj+1, . . . ,¬δh−3 |∼ δh−2}, Lj = δj ∧ (¬α ∨ β),
Lj+1 = {¬δj+1 |∼ δj+2, . . . ,¬δh−3 |∼ δh−2}, Lj+1 = δj+1,
. . .
Lh−2 = {¬δh−3 |∼ δh−2}, Lh−2 = δh−2.
The chain associated with C K is therefore equal to
δ0 	 · · · 	 δi−1 	 δi ∧ (¬α ∨ β) 	 · · · 	 δj ∧ (¬α ∨ β) 	 δj+1 · · · .
Example 11. We take again the penguin example where the original chain is given by
¬p∧(¬b∨f ) 	 ¬p∨(b∧¬f ) 	. Suppose we want to revise by the ‘base’ {p∧b |∼f }.
We have i = 1 and j = 2, so that the revised chain is
¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ) 	¬p 	¬p ∨¬b ∨ f 	 .
Note that, as we saw in Example 6, the chain-revision of C by p ∧ b |∼f lead to the chain
¬p ∧ (¬b ∨ f ) 	¬f 	.
Let us now test this procedure of revision by conditional bases on the problems we met
when trying to solve Cervantes puzzles (see Section 2.4.1).
In the first puzzle we have to revise the chain  by the two preferences ¬l  ¬g
and ¬w  ¬l. This amounts to a revision of the empty set by the conditional base K =
{¬w ∨ ¬l |∼ l,¬l ∨ ¬g |∼g}. This yields the rational closure of K , which is represented
by the chain l ∧ g 	 g 	. This result agrees with the solution found after several iterated
revisions.
We noticed that the second puzzle was an impossible one since the two preferences
¬w  ¬l and l  g ∧ ¬l could not coexist. Indeed, we see that the corresponding base
K = {¬w ∨¬l |∼ l, l ∨ g |∼ l ∨¬g} is here inconsistent, as we have K =⊥.
Let us finally turn to the last puzzle: the chain g ∨ ¬l 	  with canonical base
{ |∼g ∨¬l} has to be revised by the base { |∼ l, d ∨ g |∼¬g}. We have
{ |∼g ∨¬l,|∼ l, d ∨ g |∼¬g} = ⊥,
and we have therefore to take the rational closure of { |∼ l, d ∨ g |∼¬g} This leads to
the chain l ∧¬g 	 , a solution which, as we saw, could not be obtained through iterated
revisions from the original chain.
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The main interest of this method is that it rests on a simple and natural idea. The
set of conditionals to revise with is treated as partial information, which will be melt
together with as much as possible of the original inference relation in order to form a
new conditional base whose rational closure will finally provide the desired revision. As
we saw from the Cervantes puzzles, it is not possible to perform simultaneous or multiple
revision in such a way that both postulates of success and minimal change are satisfied.
Clearly, in the method we propose here, the latter has been given up at the profit of the
former, and the result is that, as expected, the conditional base K is always part of the
revised set C K , ensuring that the success postulate is always satisfied.
It is worth pointing out that this same method may also apply to address the problem
of simultaneous base revision. This problem occurs when, instead of a complete set of
preferences or a rational inference relation, we only dispose of some partial information
encoded by an original conditional base. In order to revise this base by the new and more
reliable information that is provided, the base K , we simply proceed as follows:
Definition 4. Let Lj be the j th term of the LM-sequence associated with the conditional
base L. The revision L K of L by K is then the set Li ∪K , where i is the first index
such that Li ∪K admits a rational closure.
For instance, if L is the set {p |∼b, b |∼f,p |∼¬f,p |∼a}, and we want to revise it
by K = { |∼p,p |∼f ∨ a}, we find i = 1, so that the revised base L  K is the set
{p |∼b,p |∼a,p |∼¬f,|∼p,p |∼f ∨ a}.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we considered the problem of revising a set of conditional assertions or
of rational preferences that is supposed to encode the behavior of an agent. We first dealt
with the case where the system at hand is a complete one, in which case it can be modelled
by a rational preference order or by a rational inference relation. In the simple case where
one has to revise this structure with a single preference or a single conditional, we saw that
using the chain representation technique leads to a simple solution that fully respects the
postulates of success and of minimal change. This technique cannot be directly applied to
the case of multiple revision, or revision with constraints. Another solution was therefore
proposed, in which the set that commands the revision was considered as a conditional
base, to which one adds, via the rational closure process, ‘as much as possible’ of the
original relation.
After having studied the revision of complete inference processes, we turned to the
case where the information at hand was incomplete. Again, rational closure and its
representation by chains could be successfully used to revise a rational base by a single
conditional or by another rational base.
The tool provided by logical chains reveals itself quite a performing one in the study,
be it static or dynamic, of the complete preference sets or the rational consistent inference
relations that describe an agent’s behavior in a finite environment. It may be cautiously
carried over to certain classes of conditional bases, leading to a revision process for
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incomplete information or to multiple revision. We have to underline, though, that the
solutions we presented in these latter cases have to be more precisely evaluated, and
compared with other existing solutions, if any such solutions exist. Their advantages and
drawbacks have to be carefully studied. In particular, the link between simple and multiple
revision is not quite satisfactory: the technique of multiple revision applied to a single
conditional should provide a solution identical to that given by simple chain-revision. In
this perspective, this paper may be considered only as a first attempt to show that solutions
to the multiple revision problem exist. It is to hope that these solutions will be improved in
the next future.
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